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Does easy availability of cash affect corruption? 
Evidence from a panel of countries 
Abstract 
Using annual panel data of 54 countries for the period 2005-14, we examine whether currency in 
circulation, both in aggregate and in large denominations, affects the level of corruption in a 
country. Standard panel data models suggest that the ratios of (i) aggregate currency in circulation 
to M1 and, (ii) large denominated banknotes to M1 are both statistically significant determinants of 
corruption. Tests for reverse causality within a panel Granger framework reveal uni-directional 
causality of corruption with the first variable, but a bi-directional one with the second one. These 
findings suggest that limitations of supply of banknotes of large denomination, inter alia, could be a 
tool to fight corruption and brings to the fore the important role of payment system, extending an 
earlier study by Goel & Mehrotra (2012). The results also highlight that along with government, the 
central bank of an economy can also play an important role in the fight against corruption. 
Keywords: Control of corruption Index; ICRG Corruption Index; Currency in circulation; Large 
denominated banknotes; Static panel data model; Dynamic panel data model; Panel. Granger causality 
JEL Classification: D73, E51 
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1. Introduction 
There are many studies in the economics literature on corruption and its cross-country determinants 
(Abramo, 2008; Aidt, 2003; Bardhan, 1997; Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; Graf Lambsdorff, 2005; 
Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000, 2007). Based on these studies, cross-country determinants of 
corruption could be categorized into various economic, socio-cultural and political factors. In most 
of these studies, economic factors taken into consideration are real GDP per capita, investment, 
inflation, government size, openness, population growth, educational attainment, etc.  Sociocultural 
and political factors taken are measures of ethnicity, government type, freedom of press, judicial 
efficiency, religion, etc. Interestingly, most of these determinants, especially socio-cultural and 
political ones, have limited short-run impact but tend to influence corruption significantly in the 
long run.  
It may be noted that the existing literature on corruption has mostly focused on the role of 
government but largely ignored the role of the central bank and the payment system in a country. A 
financial transaction is at the heart of corruption. Examination of this angle is important in a fight 
against corruption because, in contrast to the role of government ushering institutional changes, a 
few changes in policies by the central banks may bring quick results. While rigorous academic 
studies in this area are limited, there are many media reports which argue that transactions by cash 
are intended to avoid taxes, generate black money and facilitate petty corruption.1  Some of these 
reports also recommend that the government should withdraw or avoid printing large denominated 
                                                 
1 For example, a media report on political corruption in India finds some evidence that political parties do disburse cash 
to voters prior to elections and for which a huge amount of cash is held and transported from one place to another 
(http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/it-is-raining-cash-in-andhra-pradesh-bypolls/1/199369.html). Similarly there are 
reports on the popularity of Euro 500 banknotes among criminals and how it is facilitating global crime wave around 
the world (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article-1246519/How-500-euro-financing-global-crime-wave-
cocaine-trafficking-black-market-tax-evasion.html) 
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banknotes from circulation and simultaneously promote larger transaction via electronic payment 
system only.2 In the recent period, there are some instances wherein some economies withdrew 
large denomination banknotes to deter corruption and black markets.3  
In a cross-sectional study, Goel & Mehrotra (2012) have attempted to relate corruption to measures 
relating to the payment system in a country. They find that an increased use of paper-based 
transactions and cheques adds to corruption while card-based transaction reduces the prevalence of 
corruption. However, the scope of their study is limited because it covers only 12 advanced 
economies for the period 2004-08. In another study Goel, Budak, & Rajh (2013), using a sample of 
bribe payments from Croatia, study the effect of bureaucratic monopoly on the timing and nature of 
bribe payment. Regarding nature of bribe payment, they try to find the effect of bureaucratic 
monopoly on cash bribes. Their findings suggest that monopolist bureaucrat is more likely to 
demand bribes in cash. Adhikari & Bhatia (2010) probe whether the government of India shift from 
cash payment of wages under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(MGNREGA) to settlement through bank accounts prevents defrauding of workers thereby 
reducing leakage of public money. Based on a survey in a limited part of Uttar Pradesh and 
Jharkhand states in India, they find that the direct transfer of wages into workers’ bank accounts is a 
substantial protection against embezzlement, provided that banking norms are adhered to and that 
workers are able to manage their own accounts. In a similar study, using micro-level data from the 
Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, Muralidharan, Niehaus, & Sukhtankar (2014) evaluate the impact 
                                                 
2http://www.firstpost.com/business/economy/we-should-abolish-rs-500-and-rs-1000-notes-completely-354908.html and 
http://digitalmoney.shiftthought.co.uk/digital-money-in-india-a-path-to-better-governance/  
3 For instance, the Euro 500 has been withdrawn from circulation in the United Kingdom from May 2010 following 
concerns that it is the denomination of choice for criminals, tax evaders and terrorists due to its cost effective movement 
and storage (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/7714809/500-euro-notes-withdrawn-over-organised-
crime-fears.html). Similarly, with effect from October 2014, Monetary Authority of Singapore has stopped issuing Sg 
10000 notes to help deter money laundering, with critics complaining that the note is the bill of choice for bribe-payers 
in neighboring Indonesia (http://www.firstpost.com/world/singapore-to-stop-issuing-sg-10000-notes-to-deter-money-
laundering-1612645.html). 
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of biometrically-authenticated payments infrastructure on public employment and pension 
programs. Their results suggest that the new technology i.e. biometrically-authenticated payments 
infrastructure delivered a faster, more predictable, and less corrupt payments process without 
adversely affecting program access.    
Regarding theoretical grounding on this issue, researchers attempting to investigate the causes of 
corruption generally borrow from the broader literature on crime and punishment that considers 
lawbreakers (bribe payers and bribe payees in our case) as economic agents weighing the relative 
costs and benefits of their action (Becker, 1968; Goel & Mehrotra, 2012). However, there has been 
a scarcity of literature investigating direct relation between currency in circulation and the 
prevalence of corruption. Nevertheless, there are many separate studies related to “currency 
demand and the shadow economy” in which it is found that large shadow economy results into 
increased cash demand (Drehmann, Goodhart, & Krueger, 2002; Schneider & Enste, 2000) and 
“shadow economy and corruption” in which corruption and the shadow economy is found to be 
‘complement’ in low-income countries (Dreher & Schneider, 2009). Dreher & Siemers (2009), in a 
related research on corruption and the financial system, try to identify a link between corruption and 
capital account restrictions. They find that more corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital 
controls because they are less able to collect tax revenue. This is, because, in the presence of capital 
controls, individual seeking to make international transactions may offer bribe to avoid restrictions, 
adding to corruption.  
Based on the above discussion, we, in this paper, examine whether increased use of cash and large 
banknotes affects corruption. It is well known that illegal transactions thrive on anonymity. 
Common sense suggests that overwhelming majority of such transactions will avoid the banking 
channel and any payment involved is expected to be carried out through cash only. The role of cash 
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relative to other assets that leave traces in an economic transaction could therefore be one of its 
important determinants. The role of large denominations in illegal transactions had repeatedly been 
highlighted in the literature on money laundering (Rogoff, 2002; Rogoff, Giavazzi, & Schneider, 
1998; Drehmann et al., 2002).  It is well known that availability of large banknotes reduces the 
transaction cost of corruption. This brings to the fore the important role the central bank in a 
country could play in the fight against corruption by reducing the availability of banknotes of large 
denominations. 
Empirically, we test two hypotheses. First, we test whether the ratio of currency in circulation to 
narrow money (M1) is a statistically significant explanatory variable of corruption across countries. 
Second, we test whether the total value of banknotes of large denominations relative to M1 is 
another significant cross-country determinant of corruption. We also examine the possibility of 
reverse causality in both these cases i.e. prevalence of corruption might influence the use of cash.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the data, section 3 discusses the empirical 
methodology and section 4 presents the results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Data  
Our sample consists of 54 countries covering the period 2005-2014. We could not take time period 
prior to 2005 in our study due to unavailability of denomination-wise cash in circulation data for 
most of the countries, especially for the developing ones. Our choice of countries is also constrained 
by data availability (e.g., countries from Euro area are excluded due to unavailability of individual 
country-specific data related to cash in circulation). However, the sample is a fair mixture of high 
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income (26), upper middle income (17) and lower middle income (11) countries.4 The list of sample 
countries along with their income groups is provided in Table A.1 in Appendix A. 
Corruption is a variable that is not measured directly. However there are a number of indices that 
measure perceived, rather than actual, level of corruption in a country. This paper uses two 
alternative measures of corruption; (1) the Control of Corruption Index (CC) published by the 
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and (2) the International Country Risk Guide’s 
corruption index (ICRG)5. In comparison to the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), these indices are more suitable when it comes to cross-country and over-time 
comparison (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011, Treisman, 2007).6 According to Kaufmann et 
al., (2011), the main objective of the CC is – “to capture perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand form of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests”. The CC has a range from -2.5 (representing 
highest corruption) to 2.5 (representing no corruption). On the other hand, the ICRG has a range of 
0-6, with a higher score means less corruption. The ICRG is captured from statements like ‘high 
government officials are likely to demand special payments’ and ‘illegal payments are generally 
expected throughout lower levels of government’ in the form of ‘bribes connected with import and 
export licences, exchange rate controls, tax assessment, police protections, or loans’ (Seldadyo & 
de Haan, 2006; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997).     
                                                 
4 The classification is based on the World Bank Income Classification, 2015. The World Bank Income Classification is 
based on gross national income (GNI) per capita. High income (HI) countries are those with a GNI of more than 
$12,736 in 2014. Upper middle (UMI) is one with a GNI of between $4,125 to $12,756 while lower middle (LMI) is 
one with GNI between $1,045 to $4,125 in 2014. Those with a GNI of $1,045 or lower in 2014 are low income (LI) 
countries.  
5 The number of sample countries reduces to 51 when we use ICRG corruption index as a corruption measure. The 
ICRG corruption index is not available for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Korea and Kyrgyzstan. 
6According to Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2012) report, the CPI score is calculated based 
on an updated methodology from 2012 onward. Under the previously used methodology, CPI scores are not comparable 
over time 
(http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2012_CPIUpdatedMethodology_EMBARGO_EN.pdf). 
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We take the ratio of aggregate currency in circulation to M1 (CIC) as well as large denominated 
banknotes to M1 (LCIC) as a measure of cash. Here M1 is the sum of total currency and demand 
deposits. We define large denominated banknotes as the ratio of the sum of two largest denominated 
banknotes to aggregate currency in circulation. The reason for taking two largest denominated 
banknotes is because some of the largest or second largest denominated banknotes came into 
existence during 2005-14 while some of them were withdrawn from the circulation. In this study, 
the data related to currency in circulation and M1 were taken from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). However, it is difficult to get denomination wise banknotes data from a single source like 
the IMF. We have compiled the denomination wise banknotes data from the annual reports of the 
respective country’s central bank. Table A.2 reports the value of two largest denominated banknotes 
in terms of US dollar (USD) for each sample countries. It is revealed that almost one-third of the 
countries in our sample have the value of their largest denominated banknotes more than or equal to 
USD 100.   
Regarding the controls to be included in our model, there is no broadly accepted theory of 
determinants of corruption that may guide the selection of those variables in the model. The control 
variables used in this study are income, government size, openness, inflation, internet and freedom 
of press.7 
We use GDP per capita (PCY) as a measure of income. Data for GDP per capita (in logarithmic 
form) is adjusted for purchasing power parity and comes from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. Government size (GOV) is measured as the ratio of 
                                                 
7 Initially we also took index for democracy as one of the controls, however, we had to drop it because of high 
correlation of around 0.93 with the freedom of press. The reason for dropping democracy, vis-à-vis freedom of press, is 
because of its inconsistent effect on corruption (Graf Lambsdorff, 2005).  
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general government final expenditure to GDP. The share of trade as a percentage of GDP is used as 
a measure of openness (OPENNESS). Inflation (INFLATION) is measured in terms of annual 
percentage change in consumer price index. Internet (INTERNET) is measured as number of 
internet users per 100 people. The data on government size, openness, inflation and internet also 
comes from the World Bank’s WDI database.   
Freedom House publishes data index for the freedom of the press (PRESS). The freedom of the 
press index ranks countries on a scale ranging from 0-100 where a lower value indicates free press 
and vice-versa. Table A.3 and A.4 provides summary statistics and correlation matrix for all the 
variables respectively.  
3. Empirical Methodology  
Static panel data model 
Due to the lack of a strong theoretical framework for corruption, there is a lack of consensus on 
proper regression model for the analysis of corruption (Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006). Apart from 
pooled ordinary least square model (pooled OLS), the two most widely used techniques for panel 
data analysis is the fixed effects model and the random effect model. The fixed effect model 
assumes that the unobservable country-specific effects are fixed parameters to be estimated along 
with the coefficients of the model while the random effects model assumes the unobservable 
country-specific effects to be a random disturbance. Despite being used widely, the fixed effect 
model and the random effect models have their own advantages and limitations (Baltagi, 2008). To 
select between the fixed effect model and the random effect model, we rely on Hausman (1978) 
specification test to test the null hypothesis of no correlation between the regressors and the 
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individual country-specific random effects. Hence, to analyze the impact of cash in circulation, both 
aggregate as well as large denominated banknotes, on the level of corruption, the functional form of 
the panel data model is as follows: 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿′𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡; 𝑖=number of countries, 𝑡=time period             (1)   
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝐿𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿′𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡; 𝑖=number of countries, 𝑡=time period            (2) 
Here 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 is control of corruption index (CC) and ICRG corruption index (ICRG),  𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 
is the ratio of aggregate currency in circulation to narrow money, 𝐿𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of large 
denominated banknotes to narrow money, 𝑿′𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, 𝑢𝑖 indicates 
unobservable time-invariant country-specific effect that is not included in the model and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is error 
term. Further, 𝑢𝑖~ 𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and 𝜀𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜀
2). 
As we already mentioned about the inclusion of control variables in corruption study, there is no 
broadly accepted theory that may guide the selection of those variables in the model. However, the 
variable that has been found to be a robust and a consistent determinant of corruption is GDP per 
capita (Serra, 2006). It is found that with an increase in per capita GDP, corruption in a country 
tends to decrease (Bardhan, 1997).  
The government size contributes to corruption by increasing bureaucracy and red tape and it can 
also lower corruption when a larger government is associated with greater check and balances 
(Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Treisman (2001; 2007) argues that 
openness to trade is also an important determinant of corruption. He finds that greater openness to 
trade increases market competition, and it discourages rent-seeking behavior of corrupt officials by 
reducing the monopoly power of domestic producers. Inflation, measures by consumer price index, 
is also one of the robust predictors of corruption. It is found that countries with higher inflation have 
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greater corruption (Treisman, 2007). Recent studies (Andersen, 2009; Goel, Nelson, & Naretta, 
2012; Lio, Liu, & Ou, 2011) have tried to show whether internet uses have any impact on the level 
of corruption in a country. The findings suggest that increase in the internet uses do have capacity to 
reduce corruption, however, its full potential is yet to be realized. Furthermore, press freedom is 
also found to be significant determinants of corruption. It is found that better press freedom 
enhances transparency and elevates the risk of corrupt acts (Chowdhury, 2004; Freille, Haque, & 
Kneller, 2007; Serra, 2006; Treisman, 2007).  
To select between the fixed effect model and random effect model, the Hausman test suggests using 
the fixed effect model in the case of CC as the dependent variable whereas using the random effect 
model in case the dependent variable is ICRG in the equation (1) and (2). 
Dynamic panel data model 
We have an additional concern that the corruption in a country may be highly persistent. Most of 
the studies related to cross-country determinants of corruption have used lagged dependent variable 
models to address serial correlation in corruption level (Chowdhury, 2004; Dreher & Siemers, 
2009; Elbahnasawy, 2014; Lio et. al., 2011). Moreover, one of the limitations of the fixed effect 
model (the random effect model) is that it assumes exogeneity of all explanatory variables with the 
fixed (random) country effects. However, the disturbances contain unobservable, time-invariant, 
country effects that may be correlated with explanatory variables. Dynamic panel data method 
allows for such endogeneity by employing the instrumental variables technique (Baltagi, 2008).  
Following this, the functional form of dynamic panel data is written as: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡; 𝑖=number of countries, 
𝑡=time period                               (3) 
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 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽𝐿𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿′𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡; 𝑖=number of countries, 
𝑡=time period                             (4) 
Where 𝑢𝑖 is assumed to be random and independent of 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and that 𝑢𝑖~ 𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝑢
2) and 
𝜀𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜀
2).  
To estimate equation (3) and (4), Arellano & Bond (1991) have suggested a generalized method of 
moment (GMM) procedure in which the orthogonality conditions, that exist between the lagged 
dependent variable and the disturbances 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is utilized to obtain additional instruments. The GMM 
estimator uses the lagged values of the endogenous explanatory variables as instruments to address 
the endogeneity problem. Using Arellano & Bond (1991) and Blundell & Bond (1998) GMM 
framework, we have applied a two-step system GMM8 with robust standard error proposed by 
Windmeijer (2005) to estimate equation (3) and (4). As compared to one-step system-GMM, two-
step system GMM is asymptotically more efficient. 
4. Empirical Results  
Preliminary results 
To get a general idea of the relationship between corruption and cash in circulation, we plot the 
control of corruption index and measures of cash in circulation, both aggregate as well as large 
denominated, as shown in Figure 1. It shows the negative relation between control of corruption 
index and cash in circulation by using their averages over the period 2005-14. Figure 1 also reveals 
that most of the high and upper middle-income countries fall under upper-left part of the graph 
                                                 
8 For estimating system GMM, we use the xtabond2 package in STATA developed by (Roodman, 2006). 
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indicating that these countries are characterized by low level of corruption and cash in circulation 
simultaneously. In contrast, most of lower middle-income countries fall under lower-right part of 
the graph, indicating that lower middle-income countries are experiencing a higher level of 
corruption and cash in circulation simultaneously. 
<Figure 1: Scatter plot along with best linear fit of relation between corruption and cash in 
circulation > 
Column (1) to (3) in Table 1 also provides the exact relation between corruption and cash in 
circulation through pooled OLS in the presence of all the controls. The coefficient of CIC and LCIC 
is around 0.61. It means that corruption in a country tends to increase almost in a similar way, in 
terms of absolute values, with an increase in CIC and LCIC. Adjusted R-squared also tends to 
increase from 0.81 to 0.83 as we move from no measure of cash in circulation to LCIC as a measure 
of cash in circulation. In column (4)-(6), we run a similar regression with ICRG as a dependent 
variable for robustness of our results. The coefficient of CIC (0.78) and LCIC (0.59) is also highly 
significant, however, the absolute values are different due to different scale range of ICRG. 
Adjusted R-squared also tends to increase from 0.71 to 0.73 as we move from no measure of cash in 
circulation to LCIC as a measure of cash in circulation. Apart from that, most of the controls in both 
equations are significant with expected sign of coefficients. However, we may not rely on pooled 
OLS result completely because of the presence of endogeneity between some of the explanatory 
variables and possible reverse causality between our variables of interest. 
<Table 1: Estimation results of pooled OLS model > 
Static panel data model 
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Table 2 presents the results of the static panel data models. Column (1)-(2) and column (3)-(4) 
present the estimation results with CC and ICRG as a measure of corruption respectively. Based on 
the robust Hausman test statistics, column (1)-(2) is estimated using the fixed effect model while 
column (3)-(4) is estimated using the random effect model. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard error 
is used to deal with heteroskedasticity. The sign of all the control variables confirm the findings of 
previous literature and significant at least in one of the specification at least the 10% level.  
<Table 2: Estimation results of the static panel data model> 
Using CC as a dependent variable in Table 2, GDP per capita is significant in each specification. It 
means that poor countries are more prone to corruption than the rich ones. A one percent increase in 
GDP per capita tends to increase the control of corruption index by around 0.26-0.36 unit in the 
presence of all the controls. Similarly, inflation is also coming out to be significant at least at 10% 
level in one of the specifications. It indicates that countries with high inflation also suffers from 
higher corruption. One of the controls which are highly significant consistently across all the 
specification is the internet uses. The result suggests that spread of internet have the potential to 
decrease the level of corruption in a country. Because spread of internet creates transparency by 
removing information asymmetry. Similarly, press freedom is also found to be consistently 
significant at least at 10% level. It means that an increase in press freedom tends to reduce the level 
of corruption in a country. Government size and trade openness are weakly significant in at least 
one of the specifications.  
The sign of our main variables i.e. cash in circulation confirms our hypothesis to be true. CIC and 
LCIC are significant at least at 10% level. Interestingly, the impact of CIC is similar to that of LCIC 
probably because large banknotes cover a substantial portion of aggregate currency in terms of 
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value. However, there is a difference in the magnitude of the impact. With CC as a dependent 
variable, one unit increase in CIC decreases the control of corruption index by 0.20 unit i.e. 
increases the perception of corruption in a country and vice-versa. In other words, frequent use of 
cash, rather than the electronic payment system which can be utilized only if one maintains a 
deposit account in a bank, in day-to-day transaction seems to increase the level of corruption in a 
country. Similarly, one unit increase in LCIC decreases the control of corruption index by 0.30 unit. 
In comparison to aggregate currency in circulation, the impact of large banknotes on the level of 
corruption seems to be relatively high. However, with ICRG as a dependent variable, CIC is 
significant whereas LCIC is insignificant.  
Dynamic panel data model 
Table 3 and 4 presents the results of dynamic panel data model by utilizing the two-step system 
GMM procedure with CC and ICRG as a measure of corruption respectively. In each case, columns 
(1) to (4) present results with different specifications. Columns (1) and (2) provide the results of 
simple two-step system GMM, while columns (3) and (4) present the results by collapsed 
instruments which is used to limit the number of instruments generated in system GMM and avoid 
bias in the results.9  
<Table 3: Estimation results of the dynamic panel data model (Dependent variable- CC)> 
<Table 4: Estimation results of the dynamic panel data model (Dependent variable- ICRG)> 
                                                 
9 A large instrument collection, as happens in a system or difference GMM without collapsed instruments, overfits 
endogenous variables even as it weakens the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity. For more details on the 
implementation of this technique see (Roodman, 2009). 
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Based on these alternative estimation options, our estimation results in terms of the direction of the 
coefficients remain almost same. The effect of the past level of corruption is statistically significant 
at 1% level with positive sign in all models. Therefore, corruption does seem to have inertia, and 
that part of present corruption attributes to its initial conditions significantly. The presence of 
lagged level of corruption in the explanatory variables reduces the magnitude of CIC and LCIC 
including controls significantly. Using CC as a dependent variable, one unit increase in the CIC 
significantly decreases the control of corruption index by 0.16-0.20 unit while the LCIC is 
insignificant in both cases. Whereas using ICRG as a dependent variable, one unit increase in the 
CIC significantly decreases the control of corruption index by 0.31-0.22 unit while one unit increase 
in LCIC significantly decreases the ICRG corruption index by 0.22-0.14 unit. Hence, we may 
conclude that increase in cash in corruption increases the level of corruption in a country even after 
taking care of endogeneity.   
Among the controls, the effect of GDP per capita, government size, inflation, and freedom of press 
is statistically significant while openness and internet are statistically insignificant. However, the 
direction of the impact is more or less similar to the previous models.    
Reverse causality 
In some circumstances, it may happen that the prevalence of corruption in a country may pressurize 
the central bank to supply the desired amount of cash. To empirically investigate the causal 
relationship between cash in circulation, CIC as well as, LCIC, and corruption, we employ panel 
Granger causality test which utilizes both of the cross-sectional and time series data, and thus is 
more efficient than solely utilizing the time series data (Dumitrescu & Hurlin, 2012). Following Lio 
et al. (2011), we apply system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
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Blundell & Bond, 1998) that employs an instrumental variables technique to estimate the 
autoregressive equations. The null hypothesis is that cash in circulation does not Granger cause 
corruption and vice-versa. Using the model and moment selection criteria (MMSC) for GMM 
estimation (Andrews & Lu, 2001), we calculate the MMSC Akaike information criteria (MMSC-
AIC) and MMSC Bayesian information criteria (MMSC-BIC) to choose the optimal number of 
lags, and taking into consideration the limited number of time period, we use one to two lags for 
testing panel Granger causality based on measures of corruption and cash in circulation.10  
<Table 5: Panel Granger causality test > 
Table 5 presents the panel Granger causality results. The Wald tests for CIC and corruption show 
that the direction of causality is from CIC to corruption with appropriate lag. It means that CIC in 
past period lead to increase in corruption in the present period, not the other way around. Similarly, 
the Wald tests for LCIC and corruption shows the evidence of bi-directional causality. It means 
increase in LCIC in the past increases the current corruption. Also, past corruption increase the 
LCIC. We, therefore, conclude that easy availability of large banknotes facilitates corruption, and a 
corrupt environment could also sustain its availability, implying that the institutional environment 
of printing decisions of large banknotes could be an as yet unexamined determinant of corruption.  
The presence of reverse causality may bias the estimation results based on pooled OLS and static 
panel data model, we have tried to solve this issue in the dynamic panel framework by applying 
                                                 
10 The MMSC-AIC criterian selects the parameters and the instruments that minimizes the following formula: 𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶 −
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = 𝐽𝑖 − log (𝑁)(𝑙𝑖 − 𝐾𝑖); where 𝐽𝑖 refers to the Sargan test statistics used to test the validy of over-identifying 
restrictions evaluated under the model 𝑖,  𝐾𝑖 is the number of parameters to be estimated, 𝑙𝑖 is the number of moment 
conditions under model 𝑖 and 𝑁 is sample size. Replacing log (𝑁) with 2 in the above formula will give𝑀𝑀𝑆𝐶 − 𝐴𝐼𝐶. 
The number of instruments is based on the collapsed instruments. 
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system GMM. However, the problem of reverse causality has to be addressed in a separate work 
that studies the impact of corruption on the cash in circulation.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine whether cash in circulation affects the level of corruption in a country. 
The results suggest that the ratios of (i) aggregate currency in circulation to M1 and, (ii) large 
denominated banknotes to M1 are both statistically significant determinants of corruption across 
countries. Tests for reverse causality within a panel Granger framework reveal uni-directional 
causality of the corruption with the first variable, but a bi-directional one with the second variable. 
From policy perspective, we suggest that the government should evolve laws to prohibit cash 
transactions beyond a threshold level. Lastly, the central banks should also try to reduce the large 
denominated banknotes significantly, as evidence suggest that these are rarely used in legal 
transaction. 
We stress that reducing the supply of large denominations could be a novel, relatively costless and 
practically implementable option to limit corruption. In this context, it may be noted that earlier 
studies almost invariably highlighted the important role of government in curbing corruption. 
However, implementation of government policies in this area typically involves huge amount of 
transaction cost. The results of Goel & Mehrotra (2012) extended the scope of relatively costless 
anti-corruption policies by highlighting the role of payment system. Our results extend the scope of 
these policies further by bringing to the fore the important role of cash and hence the role of the 
central bank in an economy in dealing with corruption.   
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A limitation in our study is that corrupt transactions may not always involve the domestic currency; 
it may also involve foreign currencies, commodities like gold, or changes in bank deposits 
maintained in another country. This observation limits the scope of changes in payment practices as 
a policy tool in fighting corruption unless such changes are carried out on a global scale along with 
other regulatory measures. Despite these limitations, we believe that unavailability of large 
banknotes will increase transaction cost of corruption substantially. In this context, an extension of 
the present study would be to examine the detailed institutional mechanism of printing banknotes of 
large denominations in a country and to test whether variables like central bank independence are 
influential in this context and can affect corruption in a country. 
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Figure 1. Scatter plot along with best linear fit of relation between corruption and cash in 
circulation   
 
 
Notes: Here +=high income, ●=upper middle income, ▲=lower middle income.  
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Table 1. Estimation results of pooled OLS  
  Dependent Variable - CC Dependent Variable - ICRG 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CIC 
 
-0.614*** 
  
-0.775*** 
 
 
 
(-7.34) 
  
(-6.11) 
 LCIC 
  
-0.609*** 
  
-0.584*** 
 
  
(-5.70) 
  
(-3.88) 
PCY 0.508*** 0.476*** 0.498*** 0.489*** 0.464*** 0.481*** 
 
(20.38) (18.97) (19.42) (12.33) (11.65) (11.58) 
GOV -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 
(-4.41) (-4.17) (-3.97) (-3.80) (-4.01) (-3.80) 
INFLATION -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.011** -0.011** 
 
(-1.56) (-1.30) (-1.12) (-2.65) (-2.20) (-2.14) 
OPENNESS 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(5.19) (5.60) (5.31) (0.74) (0.75) (0.50) 
INTERNET 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.004** 0.005*** 
 
(1.04) (0.42) (0.89) (2.93) (2.22) (2.71) 
PRESS -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 
(-13.85) (-13.15) (-13.75) (-11.51) (-10.33) (-10.32) 
CONSTANT -3.454*** -3.012*** -3.307*** -0.651** -0.173 -0.461 
 
(-14.48) (-12.66) (-13.70) (-2.01) (-0.54) (-1.32) 
R-Squared 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.72 0.73 0.73 
F Statistics  466.59 417.47 414.28 248.30 221.01 204.68 
No. of Observations 508.00 504.00 488.00 478.00 476.00 460.00 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis are their 
respective t-statistics with robust standard error. 
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Table 2. Estimation results of static panel data model  
  Dependent Variable- CC Dependent Variable- ICRG 
 
Fixed effect Fixed effect Random effect Random effect 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CIC -0.198*** 
 
-0.365** 
 
 (-2.64) 
 
(-2.01) 
 LCIC 
 
-0.299** 
 
-0.305 
 
 
(-1.99) 
 
(-0.79) 
PCY 0.266* 0.362** 0.392*** 0.413*** 
 
(1.75) (2.20) (6.20) (6.15) 
GOV 0.007 0.009* 0.026 0.023 
 
(1.50) (1.91) (1.59) (1.39) 
INFLATION -0.003** -0.002* -0.005 -0.005 
 
(-2.39) (-1.75) (-1.12) (-1.12) 
OPENNESS -0.000 -0.000 0.002* 0.001 
 
(-0.08) (-0.16) (1.86) (1.34) 
INTERNET 0.003** 0.003** 0.004* 0.005* 
 
(2.45) (2.33) (1.67) (1.90) 
PRESS -0.002 -0.002 -0.008** -0.007* 
 
(-1.14) (-1.15) (-2.28) (-1.67) 
CONSTANT -1.853 -2.735* -1.199 -1.515 
 
(-1.42) (-1.91) (-1.36) (-1.61) 
R-Squared (Within) 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.1 
R-Squared (Overall) 0.75 0.75 0.69 0.68 
F Statistics (p-value) 4.82 5.83 17.14 13.47 
Robust Hausman Test (p-value) 0 0 0.07 0.10 
No. of Countries 54 54 51 51 
No. of Observations 504.00 488.00 476.00 460.00 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis are their 
respective t-statistics with robust standard error clustered by country. Robust Hausman test is based on Schaffer & 
Stillman (2011) user written command in xtoverid which is recommended when robust standard error is used in panel 
data. 
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Table 3. Estimation results of the dynamic panel data model 
  Dependent Variable- CC 
 
Two-step Sys-GMM  Two-step Sys-GMM (CL)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CC(-1) 0.743*** 0.792*** 0.667*** 0.728*** 
 
(6.13) (7.41) (4.54) (5.08) 
CIC -0.157* 
 
-0.198* 
 
 (-1.71) 
 
(-2.03) 
 LCIC 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.116 
 
 
(-0.86) 
 
(-1.03) 
PCY 0.117* 0.095* 0.166* 0.143 
 
(1.84) (1.69) (1.96) (1.66) 
GOV -0.006* -0.006* -0.008** -0.008* 
 
(-1.94) (-1.71) (-2.31) (-1.89) 
INFLATION -0.003** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003** 
 
(-2.44) (-2.57) (-2.70) (-2.25) 
OPENNESS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.01) (0.52) (1.43) (0.99) 
INTERNET 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.36) (0.99) (0.07) (0.75) 
PRESS -0.003* -0.003 -0.004** -0.003* 
 
(-1.91) (-1.66) (-2.34) (-1.90) 
CONSTANT -0.709* -0.604 -1.030* -0.959 
 
(-1.69) (-1.54) (-1.79) (-1.52) 
F Statistics 1054.23 890.87 1156.70 841.49 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.34 0.29 0.54 0.38 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.15 0.14 0.18 0.15 
No. of Instruments 28 28 18 18 
No. of Countries 54 54 54 54 
No. of Observations 454.00 442.00 454.00 442.00 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis are their 
respective t-statistics with Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard error. CL denotes two-step system GMM 
estimation with collapse instruments. The row for the Hansen test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of 
instrument validity. The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values for second order autocorrelated disturbances in the 
first differences equations. 
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Table 4. Estimation results of the dynamic panel data model 
  Dependent Variable- ICRG 
 
    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ICRG(-1) 0.796*** 0.822*** 0.822*** 0.862*** 
 
(11.01) (12.41) (8.40) (10.78) 
CIC -0.307*** 
 
-0.224** 
 
 (-3.40) 
 
(-2.10) 
 LCIC 
 
-0.218** 
 
-0.142* 
 
 
(-2.07) 
 
(-1.78) 
PCY 0.101** 0.093** 0.091* 0.070 
 
(2.59) (2.39) (1.79) (1.63) 
GOV -0.006 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 
 
(-1.38) (-1.14) (-1.34) (-1.10) 
INFLATION -0.005** -0.005* -0.005* -0.005* 
 
(-1.99) (-1.71) (-1.93) (-1.84) 
OPENNESS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.21) (0.38) (0.68) (0.76) 
INTERNET -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(-0.33) (-0.15) (-0.96) (-1.02) 
PRESS -0.003* -0.003 -0.003* -0.003* 
 
(-1.91) (-1.66) (-1.86) (-1.88) 
CONSTANT 0.048 -0.042 0.041 0.040 
 
(0.24) (-0.17) (0.28) (0.25) 
F Statistics 385.10 428.41 846.48 1013.35 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.29 0.24 0.33 0.29 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.56 
No. of Instruments 43 43 16 16 
No. of Countries 51 51 51 51 
No. of Observations 427.00 415.00 427.00 415.00 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicates statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis are their 
respective t-statistics with Windmeijer-corrected cluster-robust standard error. CL denotes two-step system GMM 
estimation with collapse instruments. The row for the Hansen test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of 
instrument validity. The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values for second order autocorrelated disturbances in the 
first differences equations. 
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Table 5: Panel Granger causality test 
Direction of 
Causality 
Lags 
Joint 
Significance 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
MMSC-
AIC 
MMSC-
BIC 
No. of 
Observations 
No. of 
Countries 
CIC→CC [1/2] 4.54* -2.13* -4.36 -16.56 432 54 
CC →CIC [2/2] 1.39 -1.09 -3.98 -20.20 427 54 
LCIC→CC [1/1] 6.16** -2.48** -3.14 -11.45 472 54 
CC→LCIC [2/2] 8.12** -1.47 -7.55 -39.65 409 54 
CIC→ICRG [1/1] 6.09** -2.47** -3.00 -11.25 458 51 
ICRG →CIC [1/1] 1.61 -1.27 -3.89 -12.13 455 51 
LCIC→ICRG [1/2] 3.78* -1.94* -2.79 -14.70 392 51 
ICRG→LCIC [2/1] 3.98** -1.98** -0.81 -12.67 386 51 
Notes: ***, **&* denote significant at 1%, 5% & 10% level respectively. We have tested lags [1/1], [1/2], [2/1] and [2/2] 
and presented the best model based on the minimum value of MMSC-AIC and MMSC-BIC. The test statistics for joint 
significance follow the Chi-square distribution. The test statistics for the test of sum of coefficients follow the z 
distribution if the lag length is one, and in other cases it follow the Chi-square distribution. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. List of sample countries 
Australia (HI) Ghana (LMI) Malaysia (UMI) South Africa (UMI) 
Azerbaijan, Republic of (UMI) Hong Kong SAR (HI) Mexico (UMI) Sudan (LMI) 
Bahamas (HI) Hungary (HI) Namibia (UMI) Sweden (HI) 
Bahrain (HI) India (LMI) New Zealand (HI) Switzerland (HI) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UMI) Iraq (UMI) Nigeria (LMI) Thailand (UMI) 
Botswana (UMI) Israel (HI) Norway (HI) Tunisia (UMI) 
Brazil (UMI) Jamaica (UMI) Oman (HI) Turkey (UMI) 
Bulgaria (UMI) Japan (HI) Pakistan (LMI) UAE (HI) 
Canada (HI) Kenya (LMI) Poland (HI) UK (HI) 
Chile (HI) Korea (HI) Romania (UMI) USA (HI) 
China (UMI) Kuwait (HI) Russia (HI) Yemen ((LMI) 
Congo Republic (LMI) Kyrgyzstan (LMI) Saudi Arabia (HI) Zambia (LMI) 
Czech Republic (HI) Latvia (HI) Serbia (UMI) 
 Egypt (LMI) Lithuania (HI) Singapore (HI)  
Notes: Here HI=High Income, UMI=Upper Middle Income, LMI=Lower Middle Income.  
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Table A.2. Values of large banknotes (in local currency and US dollar) 
Country D1 D2 D1* D2* Country D1 D2 D1* D2* 
Australia AUD 100 AUD 50 74.63 37.31 Lithuania LTL 500 LTL 200 160.77 64.31 
Azerbaijan, 
Republic of 
AZN 100 AZN 50 95.24 47.62 Malaysia MYR 500 MYR 100 131.58 26.32 
Bahamas BSD 100 BSD 50 100.00 50.00 Mexico MXN 1000 MXN 500 63.53 31.77 
Bahrain BHD 20 BHD 10 52.63 26.32 Namibia NAD 200 NAD 100 16.10 8.05 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
KM 200 KM 100 113.64 56.82 
New 
Zealand 
NZD 100 NZD 50 67.11 33.56 
Botswana BWP 200 BWP 100 19.92 9.96 Nigeria NGN 1000 NGN 500 5.04 2.52 
Brazil BRL 100 BRL 50 31.35 15.67 Norway NOK 1000 NOK 500 122.55 61.27 
Bulgaria BGN 100 BGN 50 56.82 28.41 Oman OMR 200 OMR 100 526.32 263.16 
Canada CAD 1000 CAD 100 781.25 78.13 Pakistan PKR 5000 PKR 1000 49.14 9.83 
Chile CLP 20000 CLP 10000 30.95 15.48 Poland PLN 200 PLN 100 53.33 26.67 
China RMB 100 RMB 50 16.37 8.18 Romania RON 500 RON 200 124.07 49.63 
Congo 
Republic 
FC 500, 
2000 & 5000 
FC 200 0.54 0.22 Russia RUB 5000 RUB 1000 88.32 17.66 
Czech Republic  CZK 5000 CZK 2000 203.92 81.57 
Saudi 
Arabia 
SAR 500 SAR 200 133.33 53.33 
Egypt EGP 200 EGP 100 25.54 12.77 Serbia RSD 5000 RSD 1000 46.16 9.23 
Ghana GH 50 GH 20 14.49 5.80 Singapore SGD 10000 SGD 1000 7407.41 740.74 
Hong Kong 
SAR 
HKD 1000 HKD 500 128.53 64.27 
South 
Africa 
ZAR 200 ZAR 100 16.01 8.01 
Hungary HUF 20000 HUF 10000 71.32 35.66 Sudan SDG 50 SDG 20 8.71 3.48 
India INR 1000 INR 500 15.76 7.88 Sweden SEK 1000 SEK 500 118.91 59.45 
Iraq IQD 25000 IQD 10000 20.72 8.29 Switzerland CHF 1000 CHF 500 1052.63 526.32 
Israel ILS 200 ILS 100 52.91 26.46 Thailand B 1000 B 500 29.43 14.71 
Jamaica JMD 5000 JMD 1000 42.85 8.57 Tunisia D 50 D 20 25.38 10.15 
Japan JPY 10000 JPY 5000 81.63 40.82 Turkey TRY 200 TRY 100 74.91 37.45 
Kenya KES 1000 KES 500 9.93 4.97 UAE AED 1000 AED 500 272.48 136.24 
Korea KRW 50000 
KRW 
10000 
44.25 8.85 UK GBP 50 GBP 20 78.13 31.25 
Kuwait KWD 100 KWD 50 333.33 166.67 USA USD 100 USD 50 100.00 50.00 
Kyrgyzstan KGS 5000 KGS 1000 79.66 15.93 Yemen YR 1000 YR 500 4.66 2.33 
Latvia LVL 500 LVL 100 781.25 156.25 Zambia K 50000 K 20000 9.62 3.85 
Source: http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ and each country’s central bank website. Exchange rate per USD is 
taken as average of 2014. 
Notes: Here D1= Largest denomination currency in local currency unit, D2= Second largest denomination currency in 
local currency unit. D1*= Largest denomination currency in USD, D2*= Second largest denomination currency in 
USD. 
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Table A.3. Summary statistics of the variables included in the study 
Variable 
No. of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Control of Corruption 
Index 
540 0.27 1.06 -1.58 2.46 
ICRG Corruption 
Index 
509 2.80 1.17 0.50 5.50 
Currency in 
Circulation to M1 
(Share) 
535 0.35 0.22 0.01 1.02 
Large banknotes to 
M1 (Share) 
519 0.25 0.18 0.02 0.81 
Log of GDP per 
Capita  
538 8.84 1.37 6.17 11.14 
Government Size 521 16.06 4.48 2.80 27.51 
Inflation 529 5.54 5.56 -10.07 53.23 
Openness 529 96.48 70.76 19.12 455.28 
Internet 537 43.87 27.85 0.90 96.30 
Freedom of Press 540 44.92 22.97 10.00 87.00 
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Table A.4. The correlation matrix for the variables under study 
  CC ICRG CIC LCIC GDP GOV OPENNESS INFLATION INTERNET PRESS 
CC 1 
         ICRG 0.931 1 
        CIC -0.630 -0.571 1 
       LCIC -0.559 -0.470 0.884 1 
      PCY 0.854 0.765 -0.584 -0.511 1 
     GOV 0.183 0.238 -0.171 -0.137 0.262 1 
    OPENNESS 0.278 0.200 -0.071 -0.112 0.240 -0.235 1 
   INFLATION -0.504 -0.486 0.378 0.347 -0.561 -0.236 -0.175 1 
  INTERNET 0.731 0.696 -0.539 -0.452 0.822 0.214 0.202 -0.523 1 
 PRESS -0.632 -0.592 0.459 0.425 -0.489 -0.361 0.064 0.285 -0.448 1 
Note: All the correlation coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
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